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ABSTRACT
Higher union density (the percentage of employees in an area who belong to unions) is
known to raise the wages of union members.  We find that in the supermarket industry,
higher density locally also leads to higher wages for non-union members. Despite this,
workers who are not in unions lose ground relative to union members. For a 10% increase
in local union densities in the supermarket industry it is estimated that the wages of union
employees in that labor market will increase by 5.3% and by 1.2% for nonunion.  Hence,
the union wage premium will increase in regions with higher union densities.
At the time of the last national examination of the retail industry in 1977, union
influence in the retail food industry was near its peak.  Subsequently union membership
and influence have declined. In 1993 a reported 25.7% of supermarket employees listed
themselves as union members, a decline from 29.4% in 1984 (NBER, 1995). After
conducting an extensive review of wage estimation literature, we focus on the structure of
wages in the supermarket industry between 1984 and 1993.
The effect of union penetration in local markets on nonunion wages, or the “spill-
over” effect, is an important focus of this study.  While it is widely accepted that the
higher the union percentage in local labor markets the higher the wages for those in the
union, the corresponding effect has not been closely examined for the nonunion sector.
To investigate this phenomenon we first replicate as closely as possible the results of a
previous supermarket wage study (Belman and  Voos, 1993).  Following a baseline
comparison of this initial estimation, we enlarge the data set to include individuals in
rural areas and from additional years.  By using a more sophisticated estimation
technique we find that increasing union densities positively affect union and nonunion
wages.  The significant results for the nonunion sector is of particular importance, as this
is the first confirmation of this effect to the best of our knowledge.Working Paper 99-05
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UNION DENSITY EFFECTS
IN THE SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY
I. INTRODUCTION
The US Department of Labor conducted a national examination of the structure of retail
food industry wages in 1977.  At that time union influence in the retail food industry was near its
peak.  Subsequently union membership and influence have declined nationwide. In 1993 a
reported 25.7% of supermarket employees listed themselves as union members (United Food and
Clerical Workers Union: UFCW), a decline from 29.4% in 1984 (Current Population Survey:
National Bureau of Economic Research CD-ROM, 1995). This study reviews the current
prevailing literature on wage determination and examines the structure of wages in the
supermarket industry from 1984 to 1993. The "spill-over" effect of union penetration in local
markets on nonunion wages is an important focus of this study.  It is widely accepted that the
higher the union percentage in local labor markets the higher the wages for those in the union
(Freeman and Medoff, 1981; Lewis, 1986; Perloff and Sickles, 1987; Belman and Voos, 1993).
The corresponding effect has not been closely examined for the nonunion sector, but union
officials have hypothesized that this effect is also positive.
This paper estimates the effect of unionization on wages in the retail food industry
(grocery) by using a full-information maximum likelihood estimation technique, which corrects
for union endogeneity.  That is to say that the impacts of wages on unionization and of unions on
wages are accounted for in the results.  We find that there is indeed a positive effect on wages of
union and nonunion employees, the stronger the union influence is in a local labor market.  For a
given 10% increase in unionization coverage in a labor market the wages of union workers will
increase by 5.3%; the wages of nonunion workers are 1.2% higher.  We also find, therefore, that2
increasing union coverage leads not only to higher wages for both sectors, but also leads to an
increase in the wage premium of union workers as compared to nonunion workers in the same
labor market.
Section II outlines structural changes occurring in the US economy and in the
supermarket industry over the past two decades.  Section III explains the estimation methods
used to determine the wage equations.  It should be noted that several wage equations are
estimated.  First, using similar data and methods we replicate an earlier study (Belman and Voos,
1993) to establish a baseline comparison for our results.  Following this we will develop both the
estimation technique and data set to explore more fully the effects of union density on
supermarket wages.  Section IV briefly describes the data to be used in this paper.  Section V
discusses the results of the estimations and section VI concludes.3
II. CHANGES IN THE SUPERMARKET INDUSTRY
It is important to review the changes occurring in the supermarket industry to provide a
theoretical basis for the wage determination. There have been vast structural changes in the
organization of supermarkets and the services they offer.  Already mentioned is the changing
strength of the union sector over the last two decades. What one can deduce from these changes
is essential in determining the correct model specification and in the verification of results; i.e.
does the model yield results that are consistent with theoretical expectations?
If we examine the differences between wages in the union and nonunion sectors it is
apparent that in both sectors there has been a downward trend in mean hourly wages (excluding
non-wage benefits). However, it is interesting to note that over this time period the union wage
premium has decreased and that wages in the nonunion sector have not decreased as substantially
as those in the union sector (see Figure 1).  This is not as one might expect, as unions are often
credited for cushioning the effects of downturns in market cycles on their members’ wages.
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As expected, full-time employees do earn significantly more per hour than their part-time
counter-parts (see Figure 2).  However, part-time wages seem to rebound from the economic
downswing in the eighties earlier than did full-time wages, probably due to the increase in the
federal minimum wage in 1989 and 1990.  This could help explain why the nonunion wages
rebounded earlier than did the union wages, as a higher percentage of union  employees work
full-time compared to nonunion employees.
There are many reasons for the downturn in wages over the last twenty years.  As
mentioned, changes in the proportion of full-time workers might help to explain  falling wages
and earnings (see Figure 3).  Over the period from 1972 to 1993 average weekly hours worked
fell from 33.0 to 29.8 for non-supervisory grocery workers.  Part-time workers receive lower
wages and non-income benefits in general than the full-time help coworkers.  Minimum wage
levels, which have not kept pace with inflation, may also explain falling real wages.
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Finally, the proportion of an industry’s workers belonging to unions may be an important
determinant of income and income inequality. Currently 12% of workers are organized in the US
(30% in 1970), compared to 40% in Germany.  In the supermarket industry modest declines in
union membership can be compared to rather substantial wage variability (see Figure 4).
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What can be inferred from these descriptive statistics?  Obviously from 1984 to 1993
there have been declines in wages (union and nonunion), declines in union membership,
increases in the proportion of part-time employees, and declines in the average number of hours
worked by supermarket employees.  Several unanswered questions remain.  Importantly, where
have these changes happened geographically?  Does the composition of a local labor market
temper economic changes in the union and nonunion sector?7
III. WAGE DETERMINATION
Determinants of wage levels include such variables as age, education, and labor union
status. Deciphering the effects of endogenous variables such as union membership is
complicated by self-selection bias.  This refers to the phenomenon that some people choose to be
in a union because of higher wage premiums.  In reviewing the previous wage determination and
union effect studies, one finds several methods used to address the union endogeneity issue and
the resulting bias of regression coefficients and error terms.
Referring to statistical analysis, it is agreed that the traditional OLS wage regression,
treating union membership as an exogenous variable, is consistent but biased.  This is due to the
correlation between union membership and the error term stemming from employee behavior or
measurement error (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1972; Schmidt and Strauss, 1975; Kahn, 1977;
Belman and Voos, 1993; Budd and Na, 1994). More recently, union endogeneity in traditional
wage analysis has taken on increasing importance. Observed union status has been regarded as
resulting from an individual’s choice, which is based on a comparison of probable earnings in the
union and in the nonunion sector.  Therefore, we estimate the effects of wage determinants on a
worker’s hourly pay using a full-information maximum likelihood estimation procedure. This
technique corrects for union endogeneity in order to yield more accurate estimates of variable
coefficients.
More specifically, this method involves estimating the wage equation in the second stage
following a first stage probit estimation of the probability of union membership yielding
consistent, asymptotically efficient coefficient estimates.  First, we estimate the probability that a8
worker decides to be a union member (or nonunion member) dependent upon age, age squared,
education, race, sex, full-time / part-time status, and right-to-work legislation by state
1. We
assume that union (nonunion) membership for worker (i) is observed if the unobserved utility
gain from being in that sector is greater than zero:  0 1 > + G ui u iu u Z , where Z  represents the
aforementioned vector of demographic information for union worker (i), G G represents the effects
of marginal changes in  Z, and  ui u1  is the normally distributed error term for the union sector.
The resulting coefficients yield the inverse Mills ratios (IMRs), which are necessary to estimate
the wage determinants (Perloff and Sickles, 1987
2; Budd and Na, 1994).
Equations (1) and (2) estimate the wages of union and nonunion workers respectively; X
is a vector of explanatory variables (such as age, education, sex, race, etc.) for worker (i), B is a
vector of the estimated changes in wage resulting from a marginal change in X, and  ui u2  is the
normally distributed error term for the union sector.  In Equations (1) and (2), F(*) and f(*)
represent the cumulative distribution function and density function, respectively, of a standard
normal variable.
                                                                
1 See Stata Reference Manual (1995): 438-445.
2 They maintained that other consistent two-step estimators are unstable due to the collinearity between regressors
(such as percentage unionized in a local labor market) and the instruments for the right-hand-side endogenous union
dummy.  To avoid this instability Perloff and Sickles employed a full-information maximum likelihood approach




u ui u u ui u
X
X
X W 2 2 1 0 )
) ˆ * (
) ˆ * (
( ln        : (1) Equation  +
G F
G




) ˆ * ( 1
) ˆ * (
( ln        : (2) Equation  2 2 1 0 ni
n i n
n i n









u G ˆ  and  n G ˆ  are the estimates from the first stage probit.  The IMR is given by f(*) / F(*); a
numerical value of the value of the ratios found within the brackets from Equations (1) and (2).
In the iterative maximization routine, IMRs are used as starting values for a numerical iteration
to obtain the maximum-likelihood results.  2 ˆ
u b  and  2 ˆ
n b  are the covariances between the error
terms in the probit and the wage equations. The null hypothesis in this procedure is that  2 ˆ
u b  and
2 ˆ
n b  = 0.  In other words, there is no difference in the determinants of union and nonunion
wages.  This null can be tested separately in the two sectors
3.  When they do not equal zero, we
can assume that self-selection bias does exist and, therefore, the use of this technique is justified.
                                                                
3 See Heckman (1976) and Lee (1978) for a further discussion of the inverse Mills ratio technique to correct for
endogeneity bias.10
IV. DATA: THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a monthly household survey of employment and
labor markets.  The US Census Bureau on behalf of the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
conducts this survey annually.  The survey data has been compiled on a NBER (National Bureau
of Economic Research) CPS Labor Extracts: Annual Earnings File Extracts: 1979 - 1993 CD-
ROM.  The survey provides information on the labor status of non-military and non-
institutionalized participants.  Approximately 60,000 households are surveyed monthly, with a
reference person from each household asked to report on his or her labor status and for those of
other household members.
The sample is designed to yield accurate measures of labor force participation by state.
For each monthly sample, eight representative sub-samples or rotation groups are included.
Each household in a rotation group is interviewed a total of 8 times: four consecutive months of
interviews, ignored for eight months, and then interviewed again for four months.  If the
occupants move they are not followed, rather the new occupants are interviewed.  Since 1979
outgoing participants have been questioned with respect to usual weekly earnings and usual
weekly hours.  These participants in outgoing rotation groups (i.e. in interview month 4 and
month 16) are used to compile the BLS Annual Earnings File (Merged Outgoing Rotation
Groups File).  The Annual Earnings File is used to produce the CPS Labor Extracts CD-ROM.
Of particular note are several new variables created from this survey and from outside
data sources.  The variable representing union density (density) was created using the local labor
market densities for regions having at least 40 observations.  For those individuals in cities with
less than 40 observations the overall state union density was used (excluding the cities with 40 or
more observations). Furthermore, these densities were calculated using a 3-year moving average11
to smooth regional shocks to union coverage or data collection anomalies.  The variable
representing log wage (lnpay) is the ratio of “earnings per week” and “usual hours per week”
from the CPS files.  This variable was found to be superior
4 to the reported “earnings per hour”.
To supplement the effect of right-to-work legislation, an additional variable was created to
supplement the rtw dummy.  This variable, rtow, weights this effect by accounting for the year
that the right-to-work legislation was passed in that state.
                                                                
4 A graphic of usual earnings per hour and the ratio of weekly earnings to usual weekly hours was generated to
identify possible outlier observations.  A 1:1 mapping was expected, but in several instances it was found that the
usual earnings per hour was incorrectly reported.  This determination was made by comparing these outlier values to
the job classification and the wages earned by the majority of workers in that category.  Hence, the ratio was chosen
as a better representation of wages for this study.12
V. RESULTS
The first set of estimations was conducted in an attempt to replicate an earlier
supermarket industry wage study (Belman and Voos, 1993).  This study included those
individuals surveyed for the CPS in 1987 and 1989 in cities having at least 40 observations. The
results from this replication can be seen below (Table 1)
 5.
Table 1: Replication of Belman and Voos (1993)
Union Workers Nonunion Workers
LnPayU Coefficient z P>|z| LnPayNU Coefficient z P>|z|
Density* 0.27426 2.682 0.007 Density -0.01569 -0.272 0.786
Age* 0.0603 9.82 0 Age* 0.044382 11.407 0
Age^2* -0.00064 -8.403 0 Age^2* -0.00046 -9.406 0
Education* 0.016542 2.748 0.006 Education* 0.034329 8.501 0
Male* 0.132009 5.702 0 Male* 0.094661 5.279 0
White* 0.057826 1.92 0.055 White* 0.132734 6.02 0
Full-time* 0.257051 11.005 0 Full-time* 0.20753 11.06 0
Supervisor* 0.197013 2.332 0.02 Supervisor* 0.405829 8.838 0
Professional* 0.159628 1.719 0.086 Professional* 0.530189 6.461 0
Technician -0.15707 -0.446 0.655 Technician* 0.3956 2.65 0.008
Sales 0.038427 1.542 0.123 Sales* -0.14899 -7.535 0
Clerk* 0.065866 1.731 0.083 Clerk 0.004249 0.14 0.888
Service* -0.28397 -3.627 0 Service* -0.19635 -5.432 0
Craft* 0.100537 3.046 0.002 Craft* 0.076406 2.184 0.029
East -0.00528 -0.117 0.907 East* 0.053723 2.067 0.039
Midwest -0.06457 -1.521 0.128 Midwest -0.00848 -0.312 0.755
West* 0.100655 2.58 0.01 West* 0.076618 2.859 0.004
Yr89* -0.06084 -3.19 0.001 Yr89 -0.00152 -0.1 0.92
City1mil* -0.0942 -2.789 0.005 City1mil* -0.08253 -3.422 0.001
City2.5* -0.11259 -5.033 0 City2.5* -0.07311 -3.89 0
Constant* 0.537632 2.1 0.036 Constant* 0.482831 6.272 0
NB:  “*” indicates that the estimated effect is significant at the 0.90 confidence level.
                                                                
5 It should be noted for the Belman and Voos comparisons, coefficients represent the marginal effect all else equal,
compared to a female, non-white, part-time supermarket laborer in the South during 1987.  Probit results can be
found in the Appendices.   In addition, “z” statistics represent asymptotic t-statistics.  P>|z| refers to the probability
that the result is insignificant.  In other words, the lower the P value the more confident we can be that the results are
significantly accurate.13
We felt this to be important as this recent study examined the effect of union coverage on
union and nonunion sectors for the supermarket industry in selective cities.  When we compare
these results to those reported in Belman and Voos (1993), we note that with the exception of the
city variables, the coefficients are all of similar sign and significance.  This is to say that the
density effect on union wages is significantly positive and is insignificantly negative for
nonunion wages.  This comparison provides a useful baseline for comparison and illustrates the
benefits of increasing the data set and econometric sophistication.
If we utilize the full-information, maximum likelihood iterative estimation using the
Belman and Voos (1993) data set we note that the density effects are slightly different, but not to
any significant degree (see Appendix A).  Following this estimation the data set used in this
study was expanded to include the years 1984 through 1993 and individuals in smaller labor
markets
6. The results for the final estimation can be seen in Table 2.  We find by adding
observations from additional years, by including individuals not in large urban centers, and by
using a fully iterative estimation procedure the density effect on the nonunion sector is
significantly positive. We should note here that there existed significant correlation between the
error terms in the aforementioned (section III) union membership estimation and wage
estimation to justify this econometric method to correct for self-selection bias.14
Table 2:  Full Data Set FIML
Union Workers Nonunion Workers
LnPayU Coefficient z P>|z| LnPayNU Coefficient z P>|z|
Density* 0.529214 13.621 0 Density* 0.156784 8.041 0
Age* 0.062941 24.53 0 Age* 0.032847 28.943 0
Age^2* -0.00069 -20.728 0 Age^2* -0.00034 -23.663 0
Education* 0.020011 6.717 0 Education* 0.029779 20.835 0
Male* 0.171507 15.19 0 Male* 0.192022 33.271 0
White* 0.052097 3.367 0.001 White* 0.055459 6.852 0
Full-time* 0.239066 21.104 0 Full-time* 0.210206 35.271 0
Manager* 0.12563 1.977 0.048 Manager* 0.530882 27.46 0
Professional* 0.133347 2.491 0.013 Professional* 0.522258 17.491 0
Technician 0.156845 1.573 0.116 Technician* 0.515064 10.28 0
Sales* 0.095644 7.991 0 Sales* 0.080245 11.402 0
Clerk* 0.067405 3.386 0.001 Clerk* 0.20424 17.404 0
Service* -0.14284 -5.691 0 Service* -0.03069 -2.553 0.011
Craft* 0.131217 7.221 0 Craft* 0.20093 15.927 0
East -0.02362 -1.313 0.189 East* 0.095433 11.922 0
Midwest* -0.07561 -4.272 0 Midwest* -0.01288 -1.791 0.073
West* 0.063011 3.679 0 West* 0.059882 7.004 0
Constant* 0.179984 2.16 0.031 Constant* 0.480399 19.835 0
NB:  “*” indicates that the estimated effect is significant at the 0.90 confidence level.
As mentioned in the introduction, this positive density affect on union and nonunion
sectors has another important implication: the union wage premium will become greater in
markets with higher unionization rates.  Premiums for the union and nonunion sectors were
calculated using these coefficients and mean values (see Table 3).  We can see that at the average
union density for the supermarket industry that the union premium is approximately $0.51 or 6%
above nonunion wages.  For cities with lower densities there is very little union premium and for
those regions with high union densities the union premium is pronounced. As noted earlier from
                                                                                                                                                                                                                
6 As reported earlier a mapping of earnings per hour and the ratio of earnings per week and usual hours per week
was conducted.  This mapping allowed incorrectly reported observations to be removed from the sample set.  There
were 4 observations removed from a sample set of 21,680 leaving the final data set of 21,676 individuals.15
Figure 2, nonunion wages had not declined to the same extent that union wages had over the
study period.  This decrease in union wage premium can now be partially explained by the
decrease in union densities during this period.
Table 3: Wage Premiums as a Function of Supermarket Union Density
Union Density* Union Wage Nonunion Wage Union Premium
0
10 - 20 $8.42 - $8.88 $8.39 - $8.52 $.03 - $.36
Mean Density = 24.5% $9.09 $8.58 $.51
30 - 40 $9.36 - $9.87 $8.66 - $8.80 $.70 - $1.07
40 - 50 $9.87 - $10.40 $8.80 - $8.93 $1.07 - $1.47
50 - 60 $10.40 - $10.97 $8.93 - $9.08 $1.47 - $1.89
60 - 70 $10.97 - $11.57 $9.08 - $9.22 $1.89 - $2.35
* This refers to the supermarket unionization rate in the local labor market as a percentage.
Examination of the other coefficients in Table 2 reveals a wealth of information
regarding employee wages in this industry and also about the economy as a whole (in so far as
the supermarket industry is a major component of the economy as a whole).  For example, note
that there are the largest positive affects from being white, a male, and a technician living in the
West if you are in a union.  However, if you are a nonunion supermarket employee the largest
positive affects are if you are white, a male, and a manager living in the East.  It can also be seen
that being a union employee mutes the effects of race, sex, and increased education.  Not being
in a union mutes the effects of age and the premium for working full-time.16
Additionally, as one might expect, the movement towards technology to increase
productivity would result in the premium for skilled labor.  This may be one reason explaining
decreased wages over this period.  Evidence supporting this hypothesis can be found by
examining the occupation variables (e.g., manager, professional, technician, sales, clerk, etc.)
which reflect positive wage premiums for all positions (with the exception of  service) as
compared to general supermarket labor.  It should be noted that managers, professionals, and
technicians all receive much higher wage premiums in the nonunion sector as compared to the
union sector.
If we use the Oaxaca decomposition technique
7 it is possible to isolate the union wage
premium, conditional on sample means and union density.  By using sample means for the
explanatory variables we find that there exists on average for the industry a union wage premium
of 28.3%. When we include the significant union density effect (at the average unionization rate)
we find that this premium increases to 31.5%.
                                                                
7 The Oaxaca  (1973) decomposition technique is based on estimation results using sample means as a means to
separate out the differences between union and nonunion wages.17
VI.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
After conducting an extensive review of wage estimation literature, we have focused on
the structure of wages in the supermarket industry between 1984 and 1993.  We replicate as
closely as possible the results of a previous supermarket wage study.  Following a baseline
comparison of this initial estimation, we enlarge the data set to include individuals in rural areas
and from additional years.  By using a more sophisticated estimation technique we find that
increasing union densities positively affect union and nonunion wages.  The significant results
for the nonunion sector is of particular importance, as this is the first confirmation of this effect
to the best of our knowledge.  Furthermore, the effect of increasing union densities in local labor
markets will additionally increase the premium enjoyed by union workers.
It should be noted that this examination of supermarket wages relies on the self-reported
usual earnings as collected in the CPS.  This may introduce measurement bias
8.  In addition, the
estimations of wage used for this study omit the non-wage benefits as part of the estimation
procedure, which over the ten-year sample period could mask many employer/employee
relations, especially when examining the union effects on wage.  As reported by the FMI in
1995, an average store pays its employees about 25 cents in fringe benefits out of every dollar
spent on salary.  Despite technological and structural changes in supermarkets, food-marketing
remains highly labor intensive as compared to other national industries
9. Not surprisingly, the
union effect on fringe benefits has been found to be much larger than the union wage effect
                                                                
8 Other studies that have used the Current Population Survey as a data source for calculating similar estimates of
wage determinants have reported the estimated percentage gains in wages due to collective bargaining to be lower
than estimates obtained using other sources of data (see Freeman and Medoff, 1984, pg.46).
9 In 1994 the average gross margin of supermarkets was between 23.4% and 25.8% (gross margin is the difference
between the buy and sell price of merchandise).  Of that percentage roughly fifty percent is spent on store labor costs
(FMI: Operations Review, 1994).18
(Freeman & Medoff, 1984).  An  example of  this would be the importance that  union-
negotiated  pension funds have become in capital markets.  Also not examined as a determinant
of wages are the hidden employer effects, which could cause omitted variable biases. Freeman
and Medoff (1984) cite informally that when questioned about treatment of union and nonunion
employees in a firm, some firms admit that they change the pay of their nonunion workers at
different times to disguise the union influence (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).
During this period it is evident both that the number of employees in the supermarket
industry increased and also that the percentage of those workers in the UFCW decreased. These
two factors could have affected the other regression coefficients longitudinally. Therefore, it is
important to further study the longitudinal effects on the coefficient values in the various models
used to analyze the wage data to have a more complete picture of what is actually happening.
This effect could be described as a longitudinal disturbance, which left undetected, could cause
bias in the estimation methods and corresponding coefficients.
However, based on nationwide wage data from 1984-1993 in the supermarket industry,
this study found that the average union wage premium for these years was 28.3%. In addition
this study found a positive influence of increasing union density on both union and nonunion
sectors. For a 10% increase in union density in the retail food industry for a local labor market it
is estimated that the wages of union employees will increase by 5.3% and by 1.2% for nonunion
employees in that market.  Hence, the union wage premium will increase in regions with higher
union densities.  If this is considered when calculating union effects on wage the wage premium
enjoyed by union employees in the supermarket industry increases to 31.5%.19
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Appendix A: Comparison to Belman and Voos (1993)
Summary Statistics (3691 Observations)
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age Years of age 30.91547 13.02045 16 76
Age^2 Age squared 1125.253 983.5776 256 5776
Education Years of schooling 12.36115 1.901617 0 18
Male 0=female, 1=male 0.520184 0.49966 0 1
White 0=non-white, 1=white 0.863181 0.343703 0 1
Full-time 0=part-time, 1=full-time 0.587104 0.492421 0 1
Supervisor Supervisor 0.024384 0.154258 0 1
Professional Professional 0.009754 0.09829 0 1
Technician Technician 0.001897 0.043514 0 1
Sales Sales 0.356814 0.479124 0 1
Service Service 0.037388 0.189737 0 1
Craft Craftsperson 0.075589 0.264376 0 1
Labor General Labor 0.263072 0.440361 0 1
Clerk Clerk 0.080737 0.272468 0 1
yr89 0=1987, 1=1989 0.506909 0.50002 0 1
city1mil In City of 1 Million 0.131672 0.338179 0 1
city2.5  In city of 2.5 Million 0.311027 0.462977 0 1
East Region=East 0.299377 0.458047 0 1
Midwest Region= Midwest 0.20699 0.405203 0 1
South Region=South 0.271742 0.444918 0 1
West Region=West 0.221891 0.415575 0 1
Uhourse Usual Hours per Week 33.97724 12.14031 0 99
Earnwke Usual Earnings /  Week 276.3403 207.7751 5 1923
Pay Ratio: earnwke/uhourse 9.336233 10.32628 0.848005 553.5282
Lnpay Log of Pay 2.089994 0.501704 -0.16487 6.316313
Lnpayu Log of Pay for Union 2.281727 0.467708 -0.16487 3.949236
Lnpaynu Log of Pay Nonunion 1.975187 0.486143 0.258359 6.316313
Density Local Union Density 0.374424 0.206464 0 0.677419
Union 0=nonunion, 1=union 0.374424 0.48404 0 1
Right-to-
Work
0=not in a rtw state
1= living in a rtw state
0.281225 0.449658 0 122
Appendix B
Full Data Set:  Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 21676 30.43864 13.00361 16 90
Age^2 21676 1095.597 988.0103 256 8100
Education 21676 12.22506 1.828592 0 18
White 21676 0.885542 0.318375 0 1
Male 21676 0.478271 0.499539 0 1
Full-time 21676 0.557437 0.496702 0 1
Manager 21676 0.016701 0.12815 0 1
Professional 21676 0.007843 0.088214 0 1
Technician 21676 0.002537 0.05031 0 1
Sales 21676 0.521591 0.499545 0 1
Clerk 21676 0.068601 0.252781 0 1
Service 21676 0.054161 0.226341 0 1
Craft 21676 0.062327 0.241754 0 1
Labor 21676 0.266239 0.442001 0 1
East 21676 0.230947 0.421448 0 1
Midwest 21676 0.244833 0.429998 0 1
South 21676 0.317217 0.465404 0 1
West 21676 0.207003 0.405167 0 1
Pay 21676 7.718098 4.261058 1.165323 56.02288
Uhourse 21676 33.02625 11.98504 1 99
Earnwke 21676 240.2649 192.4188 7 1923
Logpay 21676 1.928182 0.455745 0.152998 4.02576
Lnpayu 5221 2.171114 0.467127 0.152998 3.973137
Lnpaynu 16455 1.851102 0.423929 0.152998 4.02576
Density 21676 0.245202 0.181977 0 0.804878
Union 21676 0.240866 0.427619 0 1
Rtw 21676 0.383742 0.486308 0 1
Rtow 21676 0.263584 0.390545 0 123
Summary Statistics
Union Sample Nonunion Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Age 5221 31.66137 12.39741 Age 16455 30.05068 13.16679
Age^2 5221 1156.108 925.9995 Age^2 16455 1076.397 1006.155
Education 5221 12.33212 1.662875 Education 16455 12.1911 1.876891
White 5221 0.891017 0.311648 White 16455 0.883804 0.320469
Male 5221 0.50565 0.500016 Male 16455 0.469584 0.499089
Full-time 5221 0.572113 0.49482 Full-time 16455 0.55278 0.497222
Manager 5221 0.005746 0.075592 Manager 16455 0.020176 0.140607
Professional 5221 0.008236 0.090386 Professional 16455 0.007718 0.087515
Technician 5221 0.002298 0.047891 Technician 16455 0.002613 0.051054
Sales 5221 0.450872 0.497628 Sales 16455 0.544029 0.498073
Clerk 5221 0.073932 0.261686 Clerk 16455 0.06691 0.249873
Service 5221 0.040988 0.198282 Service 16455 0.058341 0.234394
Craft 5221 0.095001 0.293244 Craft 16455 0.05196 0.221953
Labor 5221 0.322927 0.46764 Labor 16455 0.248253 0.432012
Density 5221 0.383113 0.157647 Density 16455 0.201444 0.166701
Lnpayu 5221 2.171114 0.467127 Lnpaynu 16455 1.851102 0.423929
Rtw 5221 0.128519 0.334699 Rtw 16455 0.464722 0.498769
Rtow 5221 0.077026 0.233487 Rtow 16455 0.322777 0.411194
East 5221 0.278874 0.448488 East 16455 0.21574 0.411347
Midwest 5221 0.263743 0.440704 Midwest 16455 0.238833 0.426384
South 5221 0.141161 0.348221 South 16455 0.373078 0.483637
West 5221 0.316223 0.465046 West 16455 0.172349 0.377695